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fenleon
5aba5f522d
- toBin(): the closed HardwareConfig::to_bin grammar — write_str/write_item prefixes, model, MAC (raw 6 B), serial, UUIDs, board, build, the 00 03 0b 52 constant, then the seven binary items in C58 export field order (serialEnc, platformUuidEnc, rootDiskUuidEnc, ROM, romEnc, MLB ASCII, mlbEnc). Corrects the rev-32/35 label: the raw second field is the MAC, not the ROM (multicast-bit + stub-type evidence). - Round-trip verified byte-exact against the live 250-B session250 capture. - ValidationCertChain: the step-1 cert data's framing (01, count, per cert u16be type, u16be len, DER; leaf LAST = DRM Technologies A01, the OAEP key cert). - NacMint/NacValidation: rngPad130 -> rngPad, generalized to 0x17c - session250.size. - Live smoke result recorded: step 1 OK vs Apple, step 2 returns 5003/EM — blob construction re-verified against the replay dumps; residue is outside the blob (spec rev 36, NAC-NOTES session-26). 217 tests green.
65 lines
5.7 KiB
Markdown
65 lines
5.7 KiB
Markdown
# Open Madrid
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An open implementation of Apple's madrid protocol (iMessage) in Kotlin. Covers the property-list codecs, the APNs "courier" push client, the IDS identity service, the encryption envelope, the registration/activation chain, and the ADI anisette chain (device provisioning, per-request OTP headers, and the validation-stamp "NAC" mint) computed fully locally in Kotlin.
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Unlike [open-absinthe](https://github.com/JJTech0130/open-absinthe), which is a mock placeholder with no real code, everything here is readable and Apache-2.0 licensed.
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## Status
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Validated:
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- The parsers handle real Apple bytes. The actual 405-entry IDS bag and 65-entry APNs bag, captured from a registered device, are committed as test fixtures and decoded with exact-value assertions.
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- The registration chain ran live against Apple (2026-10-02→04, spec rev 26): Albert activation, the packed APNs courier, the full GSA sign-in (SRP, trusted-device 2FA, PET delivery, postdata), then IDS authenticate and register — both green, `mailto:` handle active. The earlier 409 refusals turned out to be Apple's validation-stamp replay guard (one mint = one device record), documented in the spec.
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- Two live unauthenticated probes against Apple succeeded: both bag endpoints return plists this stack parses, and certificate pinning validates Apple's real TLS chains. A drift check ships with the repo (`:engine:runProbe`).
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- The courier's auth model is settled: the packed path needs no client certificate; the legacy path answers the handshake with a TLS 1.3 post-handshake `certificate_required` alert.
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- The ADI anisette chain is reimplemented natively, no emulation or helper binary: the white-box OTP ciphers, the GSA provisioning exchange, the full spim/cpim/ptm wire framing, and the validation-stamp ("NAC") mint — pear white-box cipher, blob assembly, and the 16-byte OTS signature (`NacSign`) — are transcribed clean-room from analysis of a compiled ADI implementation, verified byte-exact against oracle vectors and live captures (three genuine provisioning runs plus validation-stamp captures under an instrumented debugger). Every byte group of the exchange and of the 517-byte stamp is identified and reproduced; the full stamp computes byte-exact in Kotlin from its inputs (the earlier python reference model is retired to dev capture notes; the Kotlin port is pinned by synthetic-vector tests against it). 213 tests green, spec rev 35. A minimal public facade (`NacMint`) exposes the mint for consumers. All five wire-input mappings from the validation exchange (§1.1 C56) are now pinned and implemented: the step-2 request blob (C56-a, `NacRequestBlob` — closed by direct in-process replay of the reference client's validation context, byte-exact on two independent runs) and the hardware-identity serialization (C56-c, `HardwareConfiguration.toBin` — the closed `to_bin` grammar, keyed off the C58 Mac-Hardware-Info export identity and round-trip-verified byte-exact against a live 250-B capture). Every §1.1 mint input mapping is established; a first live step-1/step-2 smoke against Apple's real endpoints accepted the step-1 cert fetch but the step-2 POST currently returns Apple's `5003 EM` error — the blob construction re-verified correct against the capture, so the residue is outside the blob bytes (see spec rev 36). 217 tests green. No anisette server, no Unicorn, no Mac relay.
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Not validated yet:
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- No real message send or receive over the courier; renewal across sessions is untested.
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- The crypto envelopes have round-trip tests but no known-answer vectors from a live device.
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- A few wire details are capture-bound guesses, tracked in the spec's open-questions checklist.
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- PQ3 is unsupported.
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## Why another project?
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Almost every route to iMessage is closed in some way. Open Madrid is permissively licensed, dependency-light, and fully readable.
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| Project | License / catch |
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|---|---|
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| rustpush | SSPL |
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| pypush | SSPL |
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| imessagego | AGPL |
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| BlueBubbles | Needs a Mac running 24/7 |
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| OpenBubbles | Depends on closed-source open-absinthe |
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Protocol facts live in the spec: [docs/imessage-protocol-spec.md](docs/imessage-protocol-spec.md).
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## Contributing
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This is a clean-room. Contributors never read the source of rustpush, pypush, imessagego, or their forks. Two roles, kept apart:
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1. Readers study the existing projects. Their only output is the spec.
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2. Writers work only from the spec, Apple's documentation, and recordings of their own device's traffic. Don't open other projects' source or paste their identifiers into commits or issues.
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This keeps the code fully open and acceptable to F-Droid and other distribution channels.
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## Apple material
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No Apple-derived code or binary ships here, including the IMDAppleServices framework. The bundled identity in `registration/src/main/resources/imessage/fairplay/` is a synthetic placeholder, generated and self-signed, for tests only. Live activation requires Apple's real FairPlay identity, which each user stages themselves.
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One deliberate exception in spirit, documented for auditability: the ClearADI and pear white-box lookup tables (the constants the ADI OTP cipher and the NAC mint need) are constant *data* reconstructed by analyzing a compiled ADI implementation, and they ship as generated Kotlin source (`ClearAdiTablesData.kt`, `PearTablesData.kt`) decoded at startup — no Apple code, binary, or resource file is committed. The extraction method and every derived fact are documented in the spec.
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## Building
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```bash
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./gradlew build # all modules + tests
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./gradlew :engine:runProbe # live drift check
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```
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## License
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[Apache-2.0](LICENSE).
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Support my work on [Ko-fi](https://ko-fi.com/fenleon) or [GitHub Sponsors](https://github.com/sponsors/fenleon).
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